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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
CHARLES KERMIT LESLEY, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 18038 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a conviction of Production of a 
Controlled Substance (marijuana), a felony, Utah Code Annotated 
§58-37-8 (1953 as amended), and Criminal Trespass, a Class "C" 
Misdemeanor, Utah Code Annotated §76-6-206 (1953 as amended), 
in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, the Honorable Peter F. Leary, Judge presiding. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant, Charles Kermit Lesley, was charged in a two 
count information with Production of a Controlled Substance 
(marijuana), a felony, Utah Code Annotated §58-37-8, and Crimi-
nal Trespass, a Class "C" Misdemeanor, Utah Code Annotated 
§76-6-206. On August 17, 1981, he was convicted by a jury of 
both charges. On September 23, 1981, the appellant was sen-
tenced to serve a term not to exceed five years and a $900.00 
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fine and a term not to exceed 90 days and a $299.00 fine, sen-
tences to run concurrently. Execution of sentence was stayed 
and appellant was placed on probation subject to payment of 
$1,199.00 in fines and other probation conditions. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the judgment of guilt entered 
against him as to Count I with orders to the trial court to 
dismiss, or grant a new trial. Appellant seeks reversal of 
the judgment of guilt entered against him as to Count II, with 
orders to the trial court to dismiss with prejudice. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On February 16, 1981, attorney for the defendant Charles 
Kermit Lesley, filed a motion to suppress evidence. Record 
on Appeal, page 12. The memorandum in support of that motion 
contended that the arresting officer did not have probable cause 
to arrest defendant and that the search following the illegal 
arrest was in violation of defendant's Constitutional rights 
prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures. R. 13-18. 
That motion was denied and the evidence was admitted at trial. 
The facts adduced at trial from various witnesses are as 
follows: On the morning of August 21, 1980, Forest Service 
employee Eugene Lowin accompanied Narcotics Detective Steve 
Alexander and approximately ten local law enforcement officers 
to an area in Red Butte Canyon where marijuana was growing. 
The purpose for this expedition was to seize items in connec-
tion with the marijuana farm in an attempt to locate the parties 
responsible for its production. R. 115. 
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Eugene Lowin testified that there was a road leading up 
toward the compound area where the marijuana was growing. He 
also stated that only the first of three locked gates across 
the road was posted "No Trespassing". Lowin also responded 
that it was possible to enter on foot and not see the signs 
on the first gate. R. 14-15. 
Dectective Alexander testified that upon his arrival, he 
noticed a person in or near the compound where the marijuana 
was growing. R. 117. That sighting was made by him from a 
distance of about one-quarter mile, without the use of binocu-
lars. R. 138. Following a search of the area, an individual 
was arrested, that person being the defendant-appellant, Charles 
Kermit Lesley. 
The time of arrest is not clear, and portions of the tes-
timony of Lowin and Alexander are in conflict. Lowin testified 
that he did not see anyone that day other than officers until 
he saw Mr. Lesley being accompanied to the compound by sheriff's 
officer. R. 110. He advised the officer at that time that 
Lesley was trespassing. R. 101. 
Alexander testified that he asked Lowin if Lesley was 
trespassing. R. 119. Later, on cross examination, Alexander 
states that he found Lesley some fifty yards from the compound 
and arrested him, stating to the court "I just found out he 
was trespassing and arrested him." R. 141. Alexander further 
states that upon finding Lesley and inquiring of his presence, 
Lesley stated he was just hiking. R. 141-142. 
-3-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Near the close of the first day of trial, counsel for 
defendant Lesley moved for a mistrial on the ground that one 
of the jurors had been dozing throughout the trial. The motion 
was denied. R. 191. 
The trial court's instructions were presented to the jury 
with no objection as to their substances from either counsel. 
R. 213. 
Appellant was convicted by a jury of the crimes of Produc-
tion of a Controlled Substance and Criminal Trespass, as charged 
in the Information, and judgment was entered thereon. Appellant 
now takes this appeal from judgment of the trial court. 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT'S INSTRUCTION REGARDING THE FINDING 
OF INTENT TO COMMIT THE FELONY OF PRODUCTION OF A 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES WAS PREJUDICIAL ERROR. 
The appellant asserts that the trial court erred in its 
instruction to the jury regarding the elements necessary to 
convict the defendant of Criminal Trespass. The entire instruc-
tion was given as set forth below: 
INSTRUCTION NO. 12 
Before you can convict the defendant of 
the crime of Criminal Trespass, Count II, 
you must find from the evidence beyond a 
reasonable doubt, all of the following 
elements of that crime: 
1. That on or about the 21st day of 
August, 1980, in Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah, the defendant Charles Kermit 
Lesley, unlawfully entered the property 
of the U.S. Government. 
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2. That at the time of said entry the 
defendant, Charles Kermit Lesley, intended 
to commit the crime of Production of a 
Controlled Substance. 
If you believe that the evidence es-
tablishes each and all of the essential 
elements of the offense beyond a reason-
able doubt it is your duty to convict the 
defendant of Criminal Trespass. On the 
other hand, if the evidence has failed 
to so establish one or more of said ele-
ments, then you must find the defendant 
not guilty. 
Appellant's appeal of this issue is allowable to prevent 
manifest injustice, pursuant to Rule l9(c), Utah Code of Crimi-
nal Procedure. Utah Code Annotated §77-35-19(c), (Supp. 1981). 
A. INTENT TO COMMIT A FELONY IS NOT AN 
ELEMENT OF CRIMINAL TRESPASS. 
The defendant was charged in Count II of the Information 
with Criminal Trespass, a Class "C" Misdemeanor, a violation 
of Utah Code Annotated §77-6-206 (1953 as amended). 
~ 
This charge arose from allegations (to the effect) that 
the appellant entered the property of the United States Govern-
ment with intent to commit the crime of Production of a 
1 Controlled Substance. 
1. In assessing the substance and sufficiency of this charge, 
it is necessary to compare and consider the Criminal Trespass 
statute with the felony counterpart, Utah Code Annotated 
§76-6-202 (1953 as amended). 
-5-
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(Footnote 1 continued) 
These two statutes, with emphasis provided to pertinent 
sections, are set forth below: 
76-6-202. BURGLARY. (1) A person is guilty of burglary 
if he enters or remains unlawfully in a building or any por-
tion of a building with intent to commit a felony or theft or 
commit an assault on any person. 
(2) Burglary is a felony of the third degree unless it 
was committed in a dwelling, in which event it is a felony of 
the second degree. 
76-6-206. CRIMINAL TRESPASS. (1) For purposes of this 
section "enter" means intrusion of the entire body. 
(2) A person is guilty of criminal trespass if, under 
circumstances not amounting to burglary as defined in sections 
76-6-202, 76-6-203, or 76-6-204: 
(a) He enters or remains unlawfully on property and: 
(i) Intends to cause annoyance or injury to any person 
thereon or damage to any property thereon; or 
(ii) Intends to commit any crime, other than theft 
or a felony; 
(iii) Is reckless as to whether his presence will 
cause fear for the safety of another. 
(b) Knowing his entry or presence is unlawful, he enters 
or remains on property as to which notice against entering is 
given by: 
(i) Personal communication to the actor by the owner 
or someone with apparent authority to act for the owner; or 
(ii) Fencing or other enclosure obviously designed 
to exclude intruders; or 
(iii) Posting of signs reasonably likely to come 
to the attention of intruders. 
(3) A violation of subsection (2)(a) is a class C misde-
meanor unless_ it was committed in a dwelling, in which event 
it is a class B misdemeanor. A violation of subsection (2)(b) 
is an infraction. 
(4) It is a defense to prosecution under this section: 
(a) That the property was open to the public when the 
actor entered or remained; and 
(b) The actor's conduct did not substantially interfere 
with the owner's use of the property. 
-6-
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At· trial, the jury was correctly instructed as to the ele-
ments of Criminal Trespass, Utah Code Annotated §76-6-206(2)(a) 
(1953 as amended), Instruction No. 11, R.59. However, the jury 
was then misinstructed as to findings necessary to convict the 
defendant of Criminal Trespass. Instruction No. 12, supra. 
The explicit language of the Criminal Trespass statute, 
subsection (2)(a)(ii), makes it clear that the accused must 
intend to commit a crime which is not a felony. Felonious 
intent is an element of burglary, not criminal trespass. To 
instruct a jury otherwise is to frustrate the legislative inten-
tion of the Criminal Trespass statute. 
If the state wished to prosecute the appellant for his 
alleged unlawful entry coupled with felonious intent, it should 
have charged the appellant with burglary. The State's prosecu-
tion of the appellant for Criminal Trespass should be supported 
by evidence of intent to commit a crime other than theft or 
a felony, evidence which is conspiciously absent from the trial 
2 
record. Instead, the appellant was charged with and the jury 
was instructed as to an offense which borrows language from 
two separte statutes and fulfills the requirements of neither. 
2. Count I of the Information charges the appellant with the 
following: 
PRODUCTION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE, a Felony, at Red Butte 
Canyon, on or about August 21, 1980, in violation of Title 58, 
Chapter 37, Section 8(l)(a)(i), Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as 
amended, in that the defendant CHARLES K. LESLEY did knowingly 
and intentionally produce a controlled substance, to-wit: Mari-
juana by means of cultivating marijuana plants; 
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B. ALLOWING THE DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION OF 
CRIMINAL TRESPASS TO STAND WOULD RESULT 
IN MANIFEST INJUSTICE. 
The defendant in a criminal prosecution is entitled to 
appeal a final judgment of conviction. Utah Code Annotated 
§77-l-6(g) and §77-35-26(b)(l), (Supp. 1981). Generally, errors· 
assigned with regard to jury instructions must be objected to 
at trial in order to be preserved as an issue upon appeal, in 
conformity with Rule 51, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
See State v. Erickson, Utah, 568 P.2d 750 (1977), State v. Kazda, 
Utah, 545 P.2d 190 (1976). It is clear from the trial record 
that the appellant's trial counsel raised no objection to the sub-
stance of any instructions at trial. 
Despite this general approach to appeals of jury instruc-
tion issues, the appellant asserts that this appeal is appro-
priately taken under the authority of Rule l9(c), Utah Rules 
of Criminal Procedure. Utah Code Annotated, §77-35-19(c) (Supp. 
1981). This rule states: 
(Footnote 2 continued) 
Utah Code Annotated §58-37-8(b) provides that: 
(b) Any person who violates subsection (l)(a) of this 
section with respect to: 
(iii) A substance classified in schedule IV or mari-
huana shall, upon conviction, be sentenced to a term of impri-
sonment for not more than five years or pay a fine of not more 
than $5,000, or both. 
(iv) A substance classified in schedule V shall, 
upon conviction, be sentenced to one year in the county jail 
or pay a fine of not more than $1,000, or both. 
The evidence presented at trial was intended to show that 
the appellant was farming marijuana. No mention was made nor 
evidence presented from which the court or the jury could infer 
that the appellant was producing any other substance, which 
would be punishable as a Class A Misdemeanor under subsection 
It...\/.: __ \ 
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(c) No party may assign as error any portion 
of the charge or omission therefrom unless he 
objects thereto before the jury is instructed, 
stating distinctly the matter to which he 
objects and the ground of his objection. Not-
withstanding a party's failure to object, 
error may be assigned to instructions in 
order to avoid a manifest injustice. 
(Emphasis Added) 
This court very recently confronted the applicability of 
Rule l9(c) in State v. Malmrose, No. 17661, June 22, 1982. 
In that case the appellant claimed prejudicial error based on 
the trial court's failure to give an instruction regarding the 
inherent shortcomings of eyewitness identification. This court 
found such an instruction to be discretionary, and Rule 19(c) 
inapplicable since the "[d]efendant makes no showing of injus-
tice". Id. at 4. 
The manifest injustice in this case is readily apparent. 
The appellant's conviction arises from a poorly drafted informa-
tion whose language was erroneously duplicated in the trial 
court's instructions to the jury. Furthermore, the record 
shows no introduction of evidence by the state of any crime 
not amounting to a felony which would serve to reconcile the 
charge with the proceedings, and therefore cure this glaring 
error. 
Blame for this error should be shared equally by counsel 
for the state, trial counsel for the appellant, and the trial 
court itself. Appellant should not be forced to suffer the conse-
quence of a conviction due to an "oversight" at the hands of 
-9-
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the those with whom he had entrusted his fate. The appellant, 
therefore, seeks reversal of his conviction on Count II of the 
Information, with orders to the trial court to dismiss with 
prejudice. 
POINT II 
DENIAL OF APPELLANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS WAS 
PREJUDICIAL ERROR. 
Prior to trial, counsel for appellant had submitted a 
motion to suppress certain evidence which was seized from 
appellant at the time of his arrest. The motion was based on 
the assertion that Detective Alexander did not have probable 
cause to arrest the appellant and the search incident to an 
illegal arrest was in violation of Article I, Section 14 of 
the Utah Constitution and the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments 
to the United States Constitution. The appellant asserts that 
denial of this motion was prejudicial error. 3 
It has long been recognized that, although arrest warrants 
are preferred, an officer may make an arrest without a warrant 
3. The appellant asserts that all the items which were seized 
concurrent to the unlawful arrest should be suppressed as evi-
dence. Those items include: 4-P book, 11-P radio, 12-P back-
pack, 13-P trench coat, 18-P wallet, and 21-P rubber washers. 
(R. 38, 91) All the above listed items were seized from ap-
pellants person and effects absent a lawful arrest. 
The appellant respectfully submits that exclusive of these 
suppressed items, the evidence is insufficient to sustain a 
conviction for production of a controlled substance. See 
State v. Schroff, 30 Utah 2d 125, 514 P.2d 793 (1973). 
-10-
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if he has "probable cause" to make the arrest. The basic stan-
dard of probable was expressed in Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 
13 L.Ed.2d 142, 85 s.ct. 223 (1964), and has been oft-replicated 
in various state court opinions. The Court, per Mr. Justice 
Stewart, stated the constitutionally valid arrest is one in 
which: 
... at the moment the arrest was made, 
the officer had probable cause sto make it -
whether at the moment the facts and circum-
stances within their knowledge and of which 
they had reasonably trustworthy information 
was sufficient to warrant a prudent man in 
believing that the petitioner had committed 
or was committing an offense. 379 U.S. at 
91 [Cites ommitted]. 
The Utah Supreme Court has adopted the essence of the Beck v. 
Ohio, probable cause standard. See State v. Eastmond, 499 P.2d 
276 (1972), State v. Whittenback, 621 P.2d 103 (1980). The 
requirement of probable cause to arrest without a warrant is 
also reflected in the Utah Code of Criminal Procedure. 4 
4. Utah Code Annotated §77-7-2 (Supp. 1981) states: 
77-7-2. BY PEACE OFFICERS. A peace officer may make an arrest 
under authority of a warrant or may, without warrant, arrest 
a person: 
(1) For a public offense committed or attempted in his 
presence; 
(2) When he has reasonable cause to believe a felony has 
been committed and has reasonable cause to believe that the 
person arrested has committed it; 
(3) When he has reasonable cause to believe the person 
has committed a public offense, and there is reasonable cause 
for believing the person may: 
(a) Flee or conceal himself to avoid arrest; 
(b) Destroy or conceal evidence of the commission 
of the offense; or 
(c) Injure another person or damage property belonging 
to another person. 
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It is the position of the appellant that the arresting 
officer h~rbored a suspicion substantially less than probable 
cause at the time of arrest. This position is factually sup-
ported by the trial record. 
First Eugene Lowin testified that only one gate was posted 
and that a person might enter the land without seeing the "No 
Trespassing" sign. (R. 102-103). Detective Alexander knew 
or should have known that people might be in the area without 
being aware of its restricted access. Secondly, the purpose 
of the expedition on August 21, 1980, was to confiscate items 
within the compound and look for evidence of the perpetrator. 
(R. 115). The appellant was not a suspect at the time, nor 
was anyone else. Finally, Detective Alexander's initial obser-
vation of someone in the compound area was made by the naked 
eye from approximately one-quarter mile away. (R. 138). There 
is no testimony regarding any observed acts of cultivation which 
would raise the officer's level of suspicion. 
At the time the arresting officer encountered the appellant, 
there were no reasonable grounds to believe the appellant was 
a criminal offender. Despite this lack of probable cause, the 
officer arrested the appellant and searched his belongings in 
hopes of finding incriminating evidence. 5 
5. The appellant does not contest the authority of the officer 
to conduct a preliminary inquiry of the type authorized by 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) and its progeny. See State 
-12-
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(Footnote 5 continued) 
v. Folkes, Utah 565 P.2d 1125 (1977). The appellant's view 
that any.preliminary questioning occurred after he was under 
arrest and this status as a trespasser was confirmed after his 
return to the compound is supported by the following excerpts 
of trial testimony: 
Defense Counsel: Now, when you got down to the scene down there, 
you say you had occasion to find Mr. Leslie. Where exactly 
did you find him, again? 
Alexander: If my directions serve me right, he was about 50 
yards south of the compound on the right side. 
Defense Counsel: Did you have occasion to speak with him? 
Alexander: Yeah, after I placed him under arrest. I just found 
out he was trespassing and arrested him. 
Defense Counsel: So, the first thing you did was say, "You're 
under arrest?" 
Alexander: Well, I don't recall if that was the first thing. 
I believe I might have turned around to Gene Lowin and asked 
him if this guy was trespassing. 
Defense Counsel: What was the first thing you said to Mr. 
Leslie? 
Alexander: I don't recall. 
(R. 141) 
* * * * 
Prosecutor: Now, when you were there, you said that as you 
looked down into this valley where the compound area was, you 
saw a figure; did you? · 
Lowin: I didn't see a figure, no. 
Prosecutor: When did you first see Mr. Leslie? 
Lowin: After he was already down in the bottom. 
Prosecutor: I see. And you say it was about 50 yards south 
of the compound area? 
Lowin: I just saw a sheriff's officer bringing Mr. Leslie to 
the compound. That's the first time I saw him. 
(R. 109-110) 
* * * * 
Prosecutor: At the time you observed Mr. Leslie in the area 
of the compound, did you advise the narcotics officers that 
he was trespassing? 
Lowin: Yes. 
(R. 101) 
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An arrest made without probable cause is illegal, and 
cannot be cured by what a subsequent search reveals. 6 The 
Utah Supreme Court recently considered the issue of search in-
cident to arrest in State v. Whittenback, supra. That case 
involved the search and arrest of defendants at an all-night 
laundromat. In affirming the conviction, this court ruled that 
"[a]lthough the search itself precedes the arrest, the search 
is still incident to arrest if at the time of the search the 
officer had sufficient probable cause to make the arrest." 
621 P.2d at 106. 7 
Mere suspicion of criminal activity is not sufficient 
grounds for arrest. The appellant's arrest was made in the 
absence of probable cause and the admission of evidence obtained 
as a result of that arres~ was prejudicial error. 
There was no justification of the search of the Appellant 
by Detective Alexander and the consequent search of his belong-
ings which were the only items which could link him to the 
cultivation of marijuana. The case law is clear; the Motion 
to Suppress should have been granted and the evidence seized 
from the person and presence of Appellant suppressed prior to 
trial. 
6. See Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 4 L.Ed.2d 134, 
80 S.Ct. 168 (1959) in which the Court, per Mr. Justice Douglas, 
found that an illegal arrest cannot be made legal on the basis 
of an incident search which yields contraband. 
7. It should be noted that Wittenback involved preliminary 
questioning and observations by the arresting officer prior 
to the search of defendants. The instant case is one in which 
no Terry-type "stop and frisk" was made. However, the rule 
that probable cause to arrest should exist before a search is 
made is still applicable. Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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POINT III 
DENIAL OF APPELLANT'S MOTION OF MISTRIAL 
WAS PREJUDICIAL ERROR. 
Near the close of the first day of trial, defense counsel 
in the instant case moved for mistrial on the ground that one 
of the jurors was having difficulty remaining awake. The 
appellant asserts that in failing to grant the motion the trial 
court abused its discretion in such a way as to infringe upon 
appellant's right to trial by jury. 
The Sixth Amendment 8 of the United States Constitution 
guarantees " ... the right to a speedy and public trial, by 
an impartial jury. " While it is recognized that certain 
actions lie within the discretion of the trial judge, a clear 
showing that discretion has been abused allows an appellate 
court to reverse and order a new trial. State v. Belwood, 27 
Utah 2d 214, 494 P.2d 519 (1972). 
This court has not yet had the occasion to rule on the 
issue of whether failure to discharge a dozing juror is beyond 
the scope of discretion intended for the trial judge. Little 
reported case law exists from which guidance on this issue may 
be gleaned. However, the appellant cites two recent cases in 
support of this argument. 
8. Article I, Section 12 of the Constitution of the State of 
Utah is almost identical in wording. 
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United States v. Cameron, 464 F.2d 333 (3rd Cir. 1972), 
is a federal case which held that the trial court did not abuse 
its discretion in removing a juror who had appeared to be 
asleep at various times during the trial. The court stated: 
We have no doubt that a juror who cannot 
remain awake during much of the trial is 
unable to perform his duty, and that the 
Court did not abuse its discretion in 
removing the juror in the circumstances 
presented here. 464 F.2d at 335. 
People v. Dupont, New York, 444 N.Y.S.2d 40 (1981), is another 
case where a sleeping juror was discharged by the court. In 
that case, a ~ sponte determination was made by the court 
that because a juror had been observed sleeping, by the trial 
judge and other court personnel, at least six times, he was 
not qualified to serve further. In its brief analysis of the 
issue, the court described the type of incapacity which might 
justify disqualification of a juror, stating: 
In People ex rel. Moore v. Fay, 238 F. 
Supp. 1005, 1007, Judge Edward Weinfeld 
of the United States District Court stated: 
'The dereliction must be such 
that it may be said to deprive 
the parties of the continued 
objective and disinterested 
judgment of the juror, thereby 
foreclosing a fundamentally 
fair trial.' 
(Cited by Mr. Justice Harold 
Birns in People v. Phillips, 
87 Misc.2d 613, 626, 384 
N.Y.S.2d 906) 
It is apparent that this juror, not having 
heard all of the evidence, does not have 
the capacity to serve in this case and is 
therefore 'grossly unqualified' by reason 
of such misconduct. 444 N.Y.S.2d at 41. 
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These cases represent somewhat the converse of appellant's 
claim; nevertheless, they do lend support to the position that 
allowing an unqualified juror to continue to serve forecloses 
appellant's right to a fundamentally fair trial. 
It should be noted that the trial court was aware of the 
potential problem prior to the motion for mistrial, 9 as sug-
gested by this brief dialogue: 
THE COURT: Before we proceed further, Mr. Kilpack, 
I'm not trying to single you out particularly, but 
did I understand you correctly this morning when we 
were empaneling the jury, that you had been up all 
night? 
JUROR KILPACK: Yes. 
THE COURT: In the interest of, No. 1, I suppose 
you getting some sleep, but more importantly, your 
ability to remain awake during the proceedings, I 
think maybe we better recess. I noticed that you 
have been having trouble keeping your eyes open. 
JUROR KILPACK: I have been doing my best. 
THE COURT: I understand that. I am not criticizing, 
but I understand the circumstances, and I don't 
think we better continue on today. 
(R. 189) 
It is urged by the appellant that the trial court 
has discretion in determining the course of proceeding at 
trial. U.C.A. §77-35-17(h) provides: 
9. The position that the appellant should be foreclosed from 
raising this issue because he was aware that Mr. Kilpack had 
had little sleep is untenable. Counsel at trial accepted in 
good faith Mr. Kilpack's oath to uphold his responsibilities 
as a juror. His failure to do so, regardless of the circum-
stances, present legitimate grounds for examination of this 
issue. 
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(h) If a juror becomes ill, disabled or 
disqualified during trial and an alternate 
juror has been sleeted, the case shall 
proceed using the alternate juror. If no 
alternate has been selected, the parties 
may stipulate to proceed with the number 
of jurors remaining. Otherwise, the jury 
shall be discharged and a new trial 
ordered. 
This subsection allows for a trial to continue even when unf ore-
seen circumstances arise which result in loss of one of the 
jurors. By mutual agreement of the parties, the trial may con-
tinue without the disqualified juror or an alternate. However, 
if not agreement is reached, the entire jury is to be discharged 
and a new trial ordered. 
In the instant case, the fact that the trial court chose 
not to remove juror Kilpack does not rehabilitate him as a quali-
fied juror. It is well within the limits of justice for a de-
fendant to move for mistrial when it is clear that his case 
is not being attended to by the full membership of the jury 
to which he is entitled. 
The appellant submits that the trial court abused its dis-
cretion by allowing an obviously unqualified juror to remain 
on the jury. In light of this occurrence, the motion for mis-
trial was timely and refusal to grant it was error. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the appellant respectfully 
requests that the judgment and conviction be reversed and the 
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case be remanded to the District Court for dismissal of Count 
II, and dismissal of Count I, or alternatively, a new trial. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 10th day of 1982. 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I DO HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Brief of Appellant was hand-delivered to the office 
of the Attorney General, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84114 this 10th day of September, 1982. 
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